Litigating Invalidity After IPR Resolution by DiMarco, Libbie & Speed, Nathan
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 19 
Issue 2 PTAB Bar Association Article 4 
1-28-2020 
Litigating Invalidity After IPR Resolution 
Libbie DiMarco 
Wolf Greenfield, Elizabeth.DiMarco@wolfgreenfield.com 
Nathan Speed 
Wolf Greenfield, Nathan.Speed@WolfGreenfield.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Libbie DiMarco & Nathan Speed, Litigating Invalidity After IPR Resolution, 19 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 266 
(2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol19/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
LITIGATING INVALIDITY AFTER IPR RESOLUTION 12/26/2019 5:23 PM 
 
266 
LITIGATING INVALIDITY AFTER IPR 
RESOLUTION 
LIBBIE DIMARCO AND NATHAN SPEED 
ABSTRACT:  
It is becoming increasingly apparent that inter partes review (“IPR”) 
petitioner estoppel after the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issues 
a final written decision can have broad consequences on a petitioner’s inva-
lidity defenses in civil actions. This article will examine the practical impact 
of IPR estoppel and discuss strategic considerations for IPR parties involved 
in parallel district court or International Trade Commission (“ITC”) ac-
tions. This article will address four main questions : (1) when and how a 
petitioner can use paper prior art in a § 102 or 103 defense after an unsuc-
cessful IPR; (2) how IPR estoppel may impact invalidity defenses based on 
product prior art; (3) how IPR estoppel may impact a “known or used” in-
validity defense; and (4) whether IPR estoppel applies when a petitioner pre-
vails in an IPR. In limited circumstances, IPR petitioners may be able to 
pursue printed publication invalidity theories in parallel litigation after a 
PTAB final written decision. Yet, at the same time, IPR petitioners may face 
previously unexpected limitations on product prior art theories in parallel 
litigation after a PTAB final written decision. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The inter partes review (“IPR”) estoppel provision of the America In-
vents Act (“AIA”) prohibits a petitioner who has received a final written de-
cision from asserting in a related district court litigation or International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”) investigation any “ground” of invalidity “that 
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that [IPR].”1 By 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012). The IPR estoppel provision applies to both district court litigation 
and actions before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”). Id. IPR estoppel also applies to those “in 
privy” with a petitioner. Id. 
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the statute’s express term, IPR estoppel precludes a petitioner from re-raising 
in district court or the ITC any grounds actually “raised” and litigated in an 
IPR trial. This is the quid pro quo of IPR: petitioners are afforded a less 
expensive and more expeditious proceeding to challenge the validity of a 
patent, while patent owners are protected from a second bite at the invalidity 
apple.2 
Less clear, however, is the scope of estoppel for grounds that a peti-
tioner “could have raised.” As district courts have begun to address this ques-
tion, it has become increasingly apparent that IPR estoppel will be applied 
broadly to encompass invalidity theories that a petitioner did not include in 
its petition but which the petitioner reasonably could have included in its 
petition, such as obviousness theories based on printed publications the pe-
titioner admittedly knew about at the time it filed its petition, but which it 
chose not to include in the petition. It has also become apparent that district 
courts are interpreting “could have raised” estoppel even more broadly to 
place significant restrictions on what evidence a petitioner can use to estab-
lish other invalidity defenses that the petitioner could not have raised in its 
petition, such as an anticipation theory premised on a prior art product. 
This article will examine the practical impact of IPR estoppel and dis-
cuss strategic considerations for IPR parties involved in parallel district court 
or ITC actions. For example, we will examine the limited circumstances in 
which an IPR petitioner can use paper prior art in a § 102 or 103 defense 
after an unsuccessful IPR. In particular, this article will discuss how courts 
have analyzed whether a particular reference reasonably could have been 
raised in an IPR. This article will also examine how IPR estoppel may impact 
invalidity defenses based on product prior art and the ways in which IPR 
estoppel can limit an IPR petitioner’s ability to prove a “known or used” 
invalidity defense in parallel litigation. Finally, we will discuss the implica-
tions of IPR estoppel on parallel litigation when the IPR petitioner prevails 
in the PTAB final written decision, particularly in the context of ITC pro-
ceedings. 
 
 2.  Am. Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., No. 14-cv-06544, 2019 WL 
365709, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2019) (“When a party chooses to seek IPR, but only on certain grounds, 
that choice comes with consequences, notably the risk of estoppel under § 315(e)(2).”). 
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II. INVALIDITY DEFENSES IN PARALLEL LITIGATION AFTER THE 
PTAB INSTITUTES FINAL WRITTEN DECISION 
A. Invalidity Defenses Based on Paper Prior Art 
By statute, IPR petitions must be limited to invalidity theories arising 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or 103 and must be based on “prior art consisting of 
patents or printed publications.”3 Without exception, IPR estoppel precludes 
the petitioner from raising an invalidity or obviousness theory based on the 
IPR grounds that were instituted. However, IPR estoppel is not limited to 
just the petitioned grounds. Rather, the prevailing view after the Supreme 
Court decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu4 is that IPR estoppel also extends 
to non-petitioned grounds that a petitioner “reasonably could have” included 
in its IPR petition but elected not to include.5 
IPR estoppel has an expansive impact on paper prior art. As a practical 
matter, the “reasonably could have raised” standard precludes a petitioner 
from raising any references that it actually knew of at the time it filed its IPR 
petition, including references identified in invalidity contentions served prior 
to filing an IPR petition.6 With respect to references not actually known to a 
petitioner, the vast majority of courts have concluded that a petitioner rea-
sonably could have raised an unknown reference if a “skilled searcher con-
ducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover” 
the reference.7 
Still, not all paper prior art challenges are foreclosed by a PTAB final 
written decision. In f’real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., the 
District of Delaware found that IPR estoppel did not preclude the IPR peti-
tioner from relying on a printed reference that was discovered two months 
after the IPR petition was filed.8 There, the court credited the petitioner’s two 
 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 4. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018). 
 5. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (“[A] 
petitioner is estopped from asserting invalidity contentions based on prior art that it could reasonably 
have included in its IPR petition but did not.”); see Jennifer Esch et. al., Petitioner Estoppel from Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board Proceedings after SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 18 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 10, 15-17 (2019). 
 6. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 390 F. Supp. 3d 665, 678 (E.D. Va. 2019) 
(“[T]he plain language of § 315(e)(2) estops Symantec from relying on those grounds of invalidity that it 
previously identified in its 2014 invalidity contentions, but that it chose not to assert in its inter partes 
review petitions.”). 
 7. E.g., Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12-CV-02533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 18, 2016) (citing 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)). 
 8. f’real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., No. 16-CV-0041, 2019 WL 1558486, *1-2 
(D. Del. Apr. 10, 2019). 
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expert declarations, which documented previous prior art searches that did 
not uncover the disputed references.9 One expert explained that the reference 
could not be identified in a global patent database because the reference was 
a Japanese reference with no translation.10 In view of the declarations, the 
court concluded that the reference could not “reasonably have been discov-
ered by a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search.”11 
The burden of establishing that a skilled searcher could have identified 
the references lies with the party seeking to apply estoppel—generally, the 
patentee.12 The burden is relatively low, but the patentee must point to some 
proof.13 In Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corporation, the Northern District of 
Illinois declined to apply estoppel because the patentee failed to offer any 
evidence supporting that the disputed reference reasonably could have been 
discovered by a skilled searcher.14 
A minority of courts have considered whether estoppel should extend 
even further to cover references that could not reasonably be found but which 
are substantively cumulative of references that were known or reasonably 
could have been found.15 Though at least one court has suggested that it 
might adopt such a standard, no court has actually prohibited a petitioner 
from relying on a reference on that basis.16 The court in Clearlamp explicitly 
considered and rejected that standard, finding that “[m]erely being redundant 
to a ground that could have been asserted during inter partes review does not 
estop the alleged infringer . . . .”17 
Finally, while somewhat counter-intuitive, most courts have concluded 
that if a petitioner does include particular grounds in an IPR petition, but the 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at *1. 
 11. Id. at *1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. Oil-Dri Corp. of America v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-01067, 2019 WL 861394, at 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2019) (cited as “Oil-Dri II”). It is unlikely but conceivable that a party other than 
the patentee would seek to apply estoppel against the IPR petitioner. For instance, in an ITC investigation, 
the Commission Investigative Staff could move to apply estoppel. See infra Section II.D for further dis-
cussion of estoppel in ITC investigations. 
 13. Oil-Dri. II, 2019 WL 861394 at *10 (“[T]he estoppel proponent must present some evidence 
that a printed publication sufficiently describing the relevant product existed and was available upon a 
reasonable search.”). 
 14. Clearlamp, 2016 WL 4734389 at *9-10. 
 15. Id. at *8 (“One question raised by the parties’ discussion of § 315(e)(2) is the extent to which 
prior art that was not reasonably available during inter partes review can be used if it is cumulative of 
prior art that was reasonably available during inter partes review.”) (citing Star Envirotech Inc. v. Redline 
Detection LLC, 2015 WL 4744394, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015) (emphasis in original)). 
 16. Cf. Star Envirotech, 2015 WL 4744394, at *3. In Star Envirotech, the Central District of Cali-
fornia determined that the disputed reference was superior and separate from references known at the 
time the IPR petition was file, and the petitioner was permitted to assert the reference in the litigation. Id. 
 17. Clearlamp, 2016 WL 4734389 at *8. 
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PTAB declines to institute IPR for any reason—including because the peti-
tioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits—
the petitioner is not estopped from pursuing those same invalidity theories 
in a parallel action.18 As a result, one potential strategy for petitioners to con-
sider is filing multiple petitions to preserve printed publication invalidity the-
ories even if the PTAB is likely to institute on only one. Nevertheless, this 
strategy is risky in view of PTAB and district court guidance against games-
manship.19 
In view of the broad reach of IPR estoppel against paper prior art, paper 
prior art challenges under §§ 102 and 103 remain a viable option for IPR 
petitioners in parallel litigation after a final written decision only if uncover-
ing the printed reference required extensive rather than “reasonable” search 
efforts, such as when there is no available English translation of a foreign 
reference.20 On the other hand, the more difficult the reference is to uncover, 
the greater potential for the reference to face public availability challenges. 
For example, a thesis that was not properly indexed at a library and thus 
difficult for the petitioner/defendant to identify in its prior art searching may 
not be a “publication” given the improper indexing that made the reference 
difficult to locate in the first instance. 
B. Invalidity Defenses Based on Product Prior Art 
IPR is limited by statute to paper prior art challenges.21 As a result, IPR 
estoppel does not literally preclude a petitioner from later asserting an inva-
lidity challenge based on product prior art.22 One potential petitioner strategy 
 
 18. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2017) 
(“Thus, a petitioned ground for which IPR was not instituted, for whatever reason, does not give rise to 
IPR estoppel.”); see also Great W. Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, Paper 
13, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017) (“[T]he Board’s determination not to institute an [IPR] . . . is not a 
final written decision . . . and thereby does not trigger the estoppel provisions under 35 U.S.C. [§] 
315(e) . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 19. E.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of America v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-01067, 2017 WL 
3278915, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (discussing the purpose underlying IPR estoppel which includes 
preventing petitioners from having a second bite at the apple); Rubicon Comms., LP v. Lego A/S, IPR 
No. 2016-01187, Paper No. 87, at 6-8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 5, 2017) (discussing gamesmanship in the context 
of amendments to identify real parties in interest). 
 20. See SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 330 F. Supp. 3d 574, 603 (D. Mass. 2018) 
(“There thus appears to be a genuine question of material fact as to whether a diligent, skilled searcher 
would have found Adkisson at the time the IPR was field; indeed, the examiner of the ‘591 patent tried 
56 search strings and still did not turn up Adkisson.”). 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 22. See SiOnyx, 330 F. Supp. at 604 (“Therefore, to the extent SiOnyx is contending that defendants 
are estopped from relying on the S9840 CCD sensor, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.”); 
Zitovault, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 2018 WL 2971178, *4 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (“Defendants can 
rely on the prior art systems in their invalidity contentions to argue anticipation or obviousness.”). 
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to insulate litigation from the impact of IPR estoppel is to sever paper prior 
art theories from product prior art theories, pursuing paper prior art at the 
PTAB and product prior art in district court. However, it has become increas-
ingly apparent that although IPR estoppel does not preclude invalidity theo-
ries based on product prior art, IPR estoppel has the potential to hinder how 
a petitioner proves invalidity based on product prior art. 
Obtaining a physical prior art product in the same state it would have 
existed in at the relevant time period is not a simple feat. Often, no physical 
sample is available by the time patent litigation is initiated and it is not pos-
sible to analyze the product itself. Instead, expert testimony about a product’s 
features is sometimes based on documents that describe the product.23 Re-
cent developments indicate that IPR petitioners may be estopped from rely-
ing on printed documents to prove a product prior invalidity defense if those 
printed documents constitute “printed publications” that reasonably could 
have been raised in an IPR. 
In particular, several courts have suggested that an IPR petitioner can-
not avoid IPR estoppel by relying on printed publications under the guise of 
a product prior art theory.24 The Northern District of Illinois squarely ad-
dressed this issue in Oil-Dri Corporation of America v. Nestlé Purina Pet-
care Company, explaining that “[w]here there is evidence that a petitioner 
had reasonable access to printed publications corresponding to or describing 
a product that it could have proffered during the IPR process, it cannot avoid 
estoppel simply by pointing to its finished product (rather than the printed 
materials) during litigation.”25 However, the court ultimately concluded that 
the patentee failed to establish that the disputed printed materials, which in-
cluded a formulation sheet, were in fact “printed publications” that could 
have been raised in an IPR.26 The court, therefore, ruled that IPR estoppel 
did not apply.27 Other courts have reached similar conclusions.28 
 
 23. See SiOnyx, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 604 (“It is true that defendants’ expert did not examine the 
product itself, but relied on documentation describing the product. But that documentation is evidence of 
how the product is configured, how it is made, and how it works.”). 
 24. See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 271 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (“To the extent these written materials 
fall within the scope of Section 311(b), they are of course affected by IPR estoppel. Snap–On cannot skirt 
it by purporting to rely on a device without actually relying on the device itself.”). 
 25. Oil-Dri II, 2019 WL 861394, at *10. 
 26. Id. at *10 (“[T]here is no indication that the advertisements contained sufficient detail to con-
stitute a printed publication of the product or that Maxx Scoop’s formulation details were ever pub-
lished.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See SiOnyx, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 603; Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales Inc., No. 15-CV-
04475, 2019 WL 3824255, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2019). 
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In SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., the District of Massa-
chusetts indicated that an IPR petitioner may rely on printed publications 
describing a product so long as the printed publication, which could have 
been included in an IPR, is not the sole evidence of how the product works.29 
There, the court permitted the IPR petitioner’s expert to rely on both a printed 
publication and non-public manufacturing specifications to form his invalid-
ity opinion.30 
Courts have also considered the reverse: whether IPR estoppel is broad 
enough to preclude an IPR petitioner from relying on the physical product if 
the product itself is described in a printed publication that reasonably could 
have been raised in an IPR.31 Although some uncertainty remains, the grow-
ing consensus from the majority of courts that have considered this issue is 
that § 315(e) does not apply to products even if the products embody a 
printed publication that the IPR petitioner could have relied upon in the 
IPR.32 
At least one court has even allowed an IPR petitioner to assert obvious-
ness combinations that pair a product with a printed publication that could 
have been raised in the IPR. In Polaris Industries v. Arctic Cat Inc., the Dis-
trict of Minnesota found that estoppel did not apply to the IPR petitioner’s 
combination of a physical product with a patent because that combination 
could not have been raised in an IPR.33 
Under the current state of the law, IPR petitioners can be relatively con-
fident that evidence based on the product itself will not be estopped. Simi-
larly, confidential written evidence of the operation of product prior art likely 
can be asserted in litigation after an IPR final written decision. However, 
courts are likely to continue drawing the line at printed publications describ-
ing product prior art. Petitioners seeking to assert a product prior art defense 
should search for evidence that was not publicly available to replace or at 
least supplement evidence found in printed publications. 
 
 29. SiOnyx, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 601 (“If defendants were relying on the datasheet alone, this might 
be a close question. . . “). 
 30. See id. at 604 (“Defendants’ expert may rely on the combination of the publicly available 
datasheet and the private manufacturing specification to form his opinion that the publicly available prod-
uct (in combination with other references) meets the elements of the claims.”). 
 31. See Polaris, 2019 WL 3824255 at *3 (“Other courts, and this Court agrees, have held that prod-
ucts embodying patents or printed publications are not subject to § 315(e)(2) estoppel.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (“Combinations 1, 2, and 5 could not reasonably have been raised during the 433 IPR so 
Arctic Cat is not estopped from raising them in this case.”). 
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C.  “Known or Used” Invalidity Defenses 
Apart from product prior art defenses, at least one district court has 
grappled with how (if at all) § 315(e)(2) limits invalidity defenses brought 
under the “known or used” prong of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Pre-AIA 
§ 102(a) states that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless “the invention 
was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a 
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 
by the applicant for patent.”34 In a prototypical case, a defendant relies on a 
“known or used” invalidity defense when invalidating information is dis-
closed in a public presentation (e.g., a speech at a technical conference), but 
the slides for or transcript of the presentation are not published or otherwise 
made available to the interested public and thus are not available to the de-
fendant as a “printed publication” for a § 102(b) defense. 
The first (and currently only, to the authors’ knowledge) district to ad-
dress the interplay between § 315(e)(2) and a “known or used” invalidity 
theory was the Central District of California in California Institute of Tech-
nology v. Broadcom Limited.35 In Broadcom, the defendants filed ten IPR 
petitions across the asserted patents.36 At the time of the decision, the PTAB 
had issued final written decisions finding that the defendants failed to 
demonstrate that four asserted claims were unpatentable.37 Having won at 
the PTAB, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that § 
315(e)(2) estopped the defendants from challenging the validity of the four 
asserted claims.38 
The defendants opposed, arguing that they intended to rely on certain 
references they identified in their invalidity contentions as the basis for a 
“known or used” invalidity defense.39 Section 315(e)(2) does not apply to 
references used in a “known or used” invalidity defense, the defendants ar-
gued, because IPR trials may be instituted only on the basis of prior art con-
sisting of patents or printed publications.40 In other words, the defendants 
argued that because they were using the relevant references to advance 
“known or used” invalidity theories, they could not have raised those same 
references and those theories in the IPR trials. 
 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 35. Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 16-CV-03714, 2018 WL 7456042 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 
2018). 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at *9 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)). 
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The district court largely disagreed with the defendants, though its de-
cision offers guidance for future defendants on how potentially to avoid es-
toppel in similar situations. The district court addressed four separate refer-
ences that the defendants had identified in their invalidity contentions. The 
first reference (“Richardson99”) was not identified in the defendants’ IPR 
petition, but there was no dispute that it was known to the defendants and 
could have been raised in their IPR petitions.41 The Court found that the de-
fendants were estopped from relying on Richardson99 even as the basis for 
a “known or used” invalidity defense because the defendants’ “invalidity 
analysis relies on Richardson99 as disclosing certain limitations in the rele-
vant asserted claims, not on Richardson99 as confirming the testimony of a 
person regarding knowledge during the relevant timeframe.”42 The district 
court reached a similar conclusion with the second reference (“Divsalar”), 
finding that the defendants’ invalidity expert “does not rely on the Divsalar 
reference as if it is corroborative of some other testimony or knowledge; the 
Divsalar reference itself forms the basis for the invalidity opinions.”43 
The district court reached a different conclusion for a third set of related 
references—”Frey/Frey Slides.” For this reference set and the “known or 
used” invalidity theory it supported, the defendants identified at the summary 
judgment hearing “specific testimony and evidence” in the form of emails 
between and deposition testimony of Drs. Frey and Divsalar—the authors of 
the similarly named prior art references.44 This additional evidence beyond 
the literal text of Frey or the Frey Slides was sufficient for the district court 
to conclude that estoppel would not apply “at this time.”45 
Finally, for a fourth set of related references (“Pfister/Pfister Slides”), 
the district court found this set of references subject to estoppel because, like 
the first two references, the defendants expert did not rely on the references 
as “simply corroborating evidence” of what was “known or used” in the art 
but rather treated “the documents themselves as the core evidentiary basis 
supporting the invalidity theory.”46 
In a concluding section of its opinion, the district court offered “further 
thoughts on the four references.”47 In that section, the district court first re-
jected the defendants’ argument that estoppel should not apply because the 
 
 41. Id. at *10. 
 42. Id. at *11. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *12. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *13. 
 47. Id. at *14. 
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plaintiffs argued in the IPR trials that certain of the references were not 
proven to be printed publications under § 102(b).48 The district court found 
that the relevant actions for estoppel are the defendants’ actions, not the 
plaintiff’s, and it noted that the defendants continued to maintain that the 
references were printed publications.49 The district court also rejected the 
defendants’ attempt to analogize their “known or used” invalidity defense to 
the prior art product defenses that other district courts (discussed above) had 
found were not estopped.50 
The district court found that its decision was not inconsistent with those 
other decisions because the “current case offers unique circumstances” as 
“whether brought as a ‘printed publication’ or under the ‘known or used’ 
prong, the core element that forms the basis of Defendants’ prior art includes 
the same document(s).”51 It continued, and in doing so offered some sugges-
tions for how future defendants could avoid estoppel: “Defendants do not 
assert that some evidence beyond the documents supplies missing disclosure 
related to a particular claim limitation. Defendants have not identified, for 
instance, circumstances where the only citation for a limitation relies on tes-
timony of a contemporary in the field at the time of the invention.”52 And, 
finally, the district court admitted the estoppel question would have been a 
“closer call” had the defendants conceded that the slides were not publicly 
available.53 Had the defendants made such a concession, then the slides 
would not have been available for use in an IPR trial which is limited to 
“patents or printed publications.”54 
Following its initial estoppel order, the parties engaged in numerous 
rounds of briefing asking the district court to either extend the estoppel to 
other patents and claims or to reconsider its decision. In a later-issued order, 
the district court clarified its original estoppel decision and explained that 
defendants can present a “known or used” invalidity theory if there is “some 
substantive difference” between that theory and the invalidity theories that 
the defendants raised or reasonably could have been raised before the 
PTAB.55 As the district court explained, printed publications that were raised 
or reasonably could have been raised before the PTAB “cannot serve as the 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at *15. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 55. Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 16-CV-03714, Slip op. at 11-12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 
2019). 
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primary source of information for a known or used theory . . . . Instead, for 
a ‘known or used’ theory to possibly take on any meaningful difference from 
an invalidity theory based on a printed publication itself, these documents 
should merely play a corroborating or supportive role to other evidentiary 
sources.”56 With this clarification, the district court then found the defend-
ants estopped from raising all their “known or used” invalidity theories—
even the theory previously permitted—because the defendants had failed to 
identify “what timely-disclosed evidence beyond the four corners of the prior 
art documents that is germanely, substantively different from the documents 
themselves would support their purported known or used invalidity theo-
ries.”57 
D. INVALIDITY DEFENSES WHEN PETITIONER PREVAILS IN FINAL 
WRITTEN DECISION 
Several district courts have implied that IPR estoppel applies against 
only unsuccessful petitioners.58 Although the issue was addressed in the dis-
trict court opinion underlying the recent Federal Circuit decision in BTG In-
ternational Limited v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, the Federal Circuit did 
not address the issue, finding it moot in view of its holding on the merits.59 
However, at least one district court has reached the opposite conclusion, 
finding that IPR estoppel applied against a successful IPR petitioner.60 
Applying § 315(e) against a successful petitioner likely has little prac-
tical impact in district court litigation. As the District of Massachusetts 
noted, there is no substantive impact on the litigation because 
either (1) the Federal Circuit will affirm the PTAB’s decision, in which 
case the claims will remain unpatentable (as they are now) and there will be 
no reason for this Court to address their validity (or infringement), or (2) it 
will reverse the PTAB’s decision, in which case the grounds defendants 
 
 56. Id. at 19. 
 57. Id. at 22. 
 58. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1027 (E.D. Wis. 
2017) (“Section 315(e)(2) prohibits an unsuccessful IPR petitioner from asserting in the district court that 
the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that 
inter partes review.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 352, 374 (D.N.J. 2018), appeal dis-
missed as moot, 923 F.3d 1063, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that the district court had noted that 
“[t]he case law . . . appears to reflect the concept that only unsuccessful or unsubmitted arguments are 
subsequently barred”). 
 60. See SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 330 F. Supp. 3d 574, 600 (D. Mass. 2018) 
(“But the statute makes no distinction between successful and unsuccessful grounds.”). 
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asserted will no longer be “successful” grounds and defendants will be es-
topped from raising them in this lawsuit.61 
If the litigation got to the point of assessing damages before the Federal 
Circuit ruled, the court noted that it would “entertain further briefing” on 
how to handle damages awarded on claims that the PTAB found unpatenta-
ble.62 
In ITC cases, however, applying IPR estoppel against a successful pe-
titioner has the potential to have a substantial practical impact, as illustrated 
by Certain Memory Modules.63 By way of background, unlike in district 
court actions, ITC investigations often involve a neutral third-party Staff 
member of the Office of Unfair Import Investigations (“Staff”). Staff is a 
separate party, which offers an independent view on all issues, including in-
validity. However, Staff typically does not submit independent evidence. In-
stead, Staff assesses the evidence submitted by the private parties. At least 
one ALJ has held that Staff is not subject to IPR estoppel.64 
In Certain Memory Modules, the PTAB final written decision issued 
prior to the ITC hearing, finding the asserted claims unpatentable. 65 The ALJ 
determined that § 315(e) applies even against the successful petitioner, and 
precluded the respondents from submitting any §§ 102 and 103 invalidity 
evidence. As a result, although Staff was technically not estopped from as-
serting invalidity theories, Staff was practically estopped from doing so be-
cause no evidence entered the record.66 
In contrast, if the PTAB final written decision had issued after the ITC 
hearing, Staff might have been permitted to rely on the invalidity evidence 
submitted by the IPR petitioner before IPR estoppel went into effect. That is 
exactly what happened in Magnetic Tapes, where the ALJ permitted Staff to 
rely on evidence previously submitted by the IPR petitioner—before IPR es-
toppel was in effect—even though the IPR petitioner could no longer assert 
the invalidity defenses.67 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 600-01. 
 63. Certain Magnetic Tape Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1058, EDIS No. 
657436 (Aug. 17, 2018) (Init. Det.). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Certain Memory Modules and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1089, EDIS No. 679484, 
Order No. 51 (June 26, 2019). 
 66. See Certain Memory Modules and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1089, EDIS No. 
677591, Staff’s Response to Complainant’s Motion (June 3, 2019). 
 67. Certain Magnetic Tape Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1058, EDIS No. 
657436 (Aug. 18, 2018) (Init. Det.) (rejecting estoppel arguments because “the statute does not prevent 
Staff from raising the [prior art] references in this investigation, which it did”). 
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Applying IPR estoppel against a successful IPR petitioner at the ITC 
raises the issue of the appropriate remedy if the ALJ finds the claims not 
invalid. The sole remedy available at the ITC is injunctive relief, which usu-
ally takes the form of an exclusion order. Although the ITC has broad dis-
cretion in crafting remedial orders, it is extremely rare for the ITC to deny or 
even suspend an exclusion order. The ITC has indicated a willingness to par-
tially suspend an exclusion order in view of a PTAB final written decision. 
However, in that decision, the ITC explicitly noted that partially suspending 
the exclusion order had “no practical effect since [the accused products] will 
still be subject to immediate exclusion” in view of other asserted claims.68 
As a result, it is unclear whether the ITC would entirely suspend reme-
dial orders in a scenario in which the PTAB issues a final written decision 
finding that all claims at issue in the ITC investigation are unpatentable, but 
the ALJ finds the claims not invalid because the IPR petitioner is estopped 
from presenting the same evidence and legal theories at the ITC. There is a 
chance, though small, that applying IPR estoppel to a successful petitioner 
at the ITC could result in an exclusion order based solely on claims the PTAB 
has found unpatentable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
IPR estoppel has an expansive impact on the invalidity theories availa-
ble to an IPR petitioner in parallel litigation. The scope of estoppel reaches 
far beyond the theories actually addressed in the IPR proceedings and even 
impacts product prior art theories that could not be raised in an IPR. None-
theless, in certain circumstances, IPR petitioners may be able to pursue 
printed publication invalidity theories in parallel litigation after a PTAB final 
written decision. Going forward, IPR petitioners should pay particular atten-
tion to gathering non-printed publication evidence to prove product prior art 
theories and “known or used” invalidity theories. Patent owners relying on 
estoppel should support their position with evidence, including expert decla-
rations when appropriate. 
 
 
 68. Certain Memory Modules and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1089, EDIS No. 672595 
(Apr. 9, 2019) (Comm’n Op). 
